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Executive summary 
 
Concerns about counterfeiting and piracy are becoming increasingly 
widespread and have now taken on an international dimension. Higher 
standards of intellectual property protection are being set multilaterally and 
through the inclusion of intellectual property provisions in bilateral trade 
agreements. The EU Strategy for the Enforcement of Intellectual Property 
Rights in Third Countries has undertaken to revisit the approach to the 
intellectual property rights chapter of bilateral agreements, including the 
clarification and strengthening of the enforcement clauses. This approach 
should be reconsidered in the light of on-going negotiations on bilateral trade 
agreements with a number of trading partners such as Korea, India, and 
ASEAN, while negotiations on bilateral trade with Ukraine and Russia are also 
being considered. If the Lisbon Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) comes into force, the European Parliament will have a 
significantly enhanced role to play in the negotiation of such agreements, 
including the power of veto. In scrutinising and giving consent to agreements, 
it is recommended that the European Parliament takes account of the 
following: (1) if intellectual property enforcement provisions are to be included 
in agreements, this must be done on the basis of adequate evidence on the 
level of counterfeiting and piracy and its effects; (2) intellectual property rights 
are private rights and the main responsibility for taking measures to protect 
and enforce intellectual property rights should lie with individual right holders; 
(3) the European Parliament should consider carefully the need to balance 
flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement with the need for additional provisions in 
bilateral agreements to fight counterfeiting and piracy; (4) agreements that 
contain provisions on recourse to bilateral dispute settlement mechanisms risk 
weakening the multilateral dispute settlement system; (5) provisions in 
agreements that expand the scope of border measures to cover exports as 
well as goods in transit or transhipment should not be unnecessarily 
burdensome and should be subject to the availability of judicial review; (6) the 
European Parliament should encourage the EU to undertake needs 
assessments in third countries to ensure that adequate and appropriate 
technical and financial cooperation is made available on mutually agreed 
terms and conditions in order to assist with the training of police, customs 
officers, judiciary and other government officials; (7) it would be advantageous 
to establish a parliamentary forum or an inter-parliamentary observatory to 
monitor and assess the impact of bilateral agreements in the fight against 
counterfeiting and piracy.  
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The significance of intellectual property rights enforcement 
 
The exploitation of intellectual property is considered an important tool for 
wealth creation. But intellectual property rights are of little economic value if 
they cannot be enforced effectively. Well-functioning intellectual property 
enforcement mechanisms are seen as essential to ensure that right holders 
and society as a whole can reap the benefits from the intellectual property 
system (1). 
 
However, concerns about counterfeiting and piracy are becoming increasingly 
widespread and have now taken on an international dimension. They are seen 
to represent a serious threat to the intellectual property system and hence to 
national economies. Particular attention has been given to national disparities 
in the enforcement of intellectual property rights which mean that counterfeit 
and pirated products are more likely to be manufactured and sold in countries 
that are less effective than others in combating counterfeiting and piracy (2). 
 
Higher standards of intellectual property protection are being set multilaterally 
and through the inclusion of intellectual property provisions in bilateral trade 
agreements. Recent trends are marked by an increase in the number of 
multilateral institutions participating in the policy and norm setting on 
intellectual property enforcement, including the World Customs Organization 
(WCO), the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), the World Health 
Organisation (WHO), the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and Interpol. The 
United States (US) and the European Union (EU) have also taken steps to 
strengthen the enforcement of intellectual property rights in third countries 
through regional and bilateral trade agreements (3). 
 
Intellectual property rights include copyright and related rights, patents, design 
rights, trademarks and trade secrets. The term intellectual property refers to 
the specific legal rights that authors, inventors and other right holders may 
hold and exercise. Intellectual property rights are granted by governments and 
operate in the territory within which they are granted. 
 
While the terms “counterfeiting” and “piracy” do not follow a single agreed 
definition and are used in different ways, generally “counterfeiting” relates to 
the infringement of trademarks whereas “piracy” is associated with 
infringements of copyright or related rights. 
 
The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (the 
TRIPS Agreement) defines “counterfeit trademark goods” as “any goods, 
including packaging, bearing without authorisation a trademark which is 
identical to the trademark validly registered in respect of such goods, or which 
cannot be distinguished in its essential aspects from such a trademark, and 
which thereby infringes the rights of the owner of the trademark in question 
                                                 
1 See also The World Intellectual Property Organisation, Enforcement of IP Rights. Available 
at: http://www.wipo.int/enforcement/en/ 
2 See also European Commission, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (Summary): 
http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l26057a.htm 
3 See also Tekeste Biadgleng, E. and Munoz Tellez, V., 2008, The Changing Structure and 
Governance of Intellectual Property Enforcement, South Centre, Geneva, page 2. 
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under the law of the country of importation” (4). The WHO uses a similar 
definition to describe a counterfeit medicine as one that is “deliberately and 
fraudulently mislabelled with respect to identity and/or source" (5).  
 
The TRIPS Agreement defines “pirated copyright goods” as “any goods which 
are copies made without the consent of the right holder or person duly 
authorized by the right holder in the country of production and which are made 
directly or indirectly from an article where the making of that copy would have 
constituted an infringement of a copyright or a related right under the law of 
the country of importation” (6). 
  
Patent infringement is not generally included in definitions of “counterfeiting” 
and is clearly not included in the definition provided by the TRIPS Agreement 
(7). Recently, however, the term “counterfeiting” has been used misleadingly 
to describe patent infringement, particularly in relation to generic medicines. In 
fact, patent infringement cases lie outside the scope of counterfeiting and are 
dealt with more appropriately by civil proceedings before national courts 
brought by the right holder. 
 
Furthermore, the fight against counterfeiting must not undermine the 
legitimate use of TRIPS flexibilities to ensure access to medicines in 
developing countries. In this regard it is noteworthy that the European 
Parliament Resolution of 8 May 2008 on Trade and Economic Relations with 
the Association of East Asian Nations (ASEAN) “[a]ttaches particular 
importance to the fight against counterfeit pharmaceuticals which represent 
unfair competition and a danger to consumers” but “at the same time points 
out that nothing in the agreement should create legal or practical obstacles to 
the maximum use of flexibilities set out in the Declaration amending the 
TRIPS Agreement and access to medicines” (8).  
 
 
The economic importance of the fight against counterfeiting and piracy 
 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
report on The Economic Impact of Counterfeiting and Piracy states that 
international trade in counterfeit and pirated products could have been up to 
USD 200 billion in 2005, this amount is larger than the national GDPs of about 
                                                 
4 Article 51, footnote 14, of the TRIPS Agreement. Available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm4_e.htm#Footnote14 
5 The definition is included in the WHO Quality Assurance of Medicines Terminology 
Database, available at: 
http://www.who.int/medicines/services/expertcommittees/pharmprep/TermListcategory.pdf 
6 Article 51, footnote 14, of the TRIPS Agreement, op. cit. 
7 However it should be noted that EU Regulation 1383/2003 Concerning Customs Action 
Against Goods Suspected of Infringing Certain Intellectual Property Rights and the Measures 
to be Taken Against Goods Found to Have Infringed Such Rights extends beyond the scope 
of intellectual property rights infringement as defined in Article 51, footnote 14, of the TRIPS 
Agreement to include, among others, goods infringing a patent, a supplementary certificate 
(plant protection or medicinal products and geographical indications. 
8 European Parliament Resolution of 8 May 2008 on Trade and Economic Relations with the 
Association of East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P6-TA-
2008-0195 
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150 economies (9). The figure does not, however, include counterfeit and 
pirated products that are produced and consumed domestically, nor does it 
include non-tangible pirated digital products being distributed via the Internet. 
If these items were added, the OECD report concludes that the total 
magnitude of counterfeiting and piracy worldwide could well be several 
hundred billion dollars more (10). 
 
In the EU context, Directorate General Taxation and Customs Union (TAXUD) 
of the European Commission has reported that “[c]ounterfeiting is a growing 
and increasingly dangerous phenomenon” and that “[c]ounterfeited and 
pirated articles threaten the health and safety of EU citizens, their jobs, 
Community competitiveness, trade, and investment in research and 
innovation” (11). Directorate General TAXUD also reports that, in 2006, EU 
Customs seized around 128.6 million counterfeit and pirated goods and 
handled more anti-counterfeiting cases than ever before. A total of more than 
37,334 cases were dealt with in 2006, up 40% from 2005. Compared to 2005, 
Directorate General TAXUD saw an increase in almost all product sectors. In 
2006, more than 2.7 million counterfeit medicines and more than 1.6 million 
counterfeit cosmetics and personal care products were seized (12). For 
Directorate General TAXUD, the increasing use of the internet to sell fakes 
(mainly medicines) and the fact that the high quality of fakes often makes 
identification impossible without technical expertise and increases the 
challenge customs face. Directorate General TAXUD has asserted that one of 
the reasons for this explosion in trade in fakes is that criminals can now 
produce them on an industrial scale, providing increased profits. It has also 
stated that international criminal organisations are now involved in 
counterfeiting. Directorate General TAXUD also believes that terrorist groups 
are involved in counterfeit and piracy as a means of financing their activities. 
 
Methodologies used to calculate levels of counterfeiting and piracy 
 
There are concerns that statements about levels of counterfeiting and piracy 
are based either on customs seizures, with the actual quantities of infringing 
goods in free circulation in any particular market largely unknown, or on 
estimated losses derived from industry surveys. Industry estimates of levels of 
counterfeit and piracy are considered to exhibit an upward bias, with the 
difficulty in estimating levels of actual counterfeiting and piracy exacerbated 
by the failure to use the definition of the terms as set down in the TRIPS 
Agreement (13). The high levels reported in most industry-based surveys has 
been identified as a problematic aspect of the recent expert reports used as 
the basis of the 2007 OECD report on counterfeiting and piracy. The OECD 
report has also been criticised for framing the problem of intellectual property-
                                                 
9 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2007) The Economic 
Impact of Counterfeiting and Piracy, DSTI/IND(2007)9/PART4/REV1. 
10 OECD Project on Counterfeiting and Piracy. Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/document/50/0,3343,en_2649_34173_39542514_1_1_1_1,00.html 
11 Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/customs_controls/counterfeit_piracy/combating
/index_en.htm 
12 Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/customs_controls/counterfeit_piracy/statistics/i
ndex_en.htm 
13 Tekeste Biadgleng, E. and Munoz Tellez, V., op. cit., page 20. 
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related crime exclusively through the lens of “piracy” and lost corporate 
revenue, in doing so overlooking the social costs of intellectual property 
enforcement that restricts access to knowledge, creates barriers to follow-on 
innovation, and encourages anti-competitive business practices (14). 
 
A key assumption in most estimates is that the sale of counterfeit and pirated 
goods displaces legitimate sales, regardless of how the price of goods may be 
affected by stronger copyright and trademark protection. An issue of concern 
for the OECD has been the extent that assumptions can be made about the 
degree of substitutability between infringing and legitimate items (15). 
Likewise, the methodology used in the surveys to calculate levels of 
intellectual property rights infringement in third countries has been criticised 
on grounds that it is largely based on the industry’s subjective opinion (16). For 
developing countries there is a risk that the promotion of increased emphasis 
on intellectual property rights enforcement, based on imperatives driven by 
industry figures, increases the need for the allocation of additional human and 
financial resources and limits the scope for utilising TRIPS flexibilities. There 
is also the problem that systematic research on the health and safety effects 
of counterfeit products is considered to be almost non-existent (17). 
 
EU initiatives to combat counterfeiting and piracy 
 
The EU has undertaken a number of initiatives in relation to the fight against 
counterfeiting and piracy, the most important of which can be summarised as 
follows: 
 
• Combating Counterfeiting and Piracy in the Single Market - Green 
Paper. COM (98) 569 final, 15 October 1998; 
 
• Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee. Follow-up to 
the Green Paper on combating counterfeiting and piracy in the 
single market COM(2000)789 final; 
 
• Council Regulation (EC) No. 1383/2003 concerning customs action 
against goods suspected of infringing certain intellectual property 
rights and the measures to be taken against goods found to have 
infringed such rights has been in force since 1 July 2004 (18); 
 
                                                 
14 Shaw, A., 2008, “The Problem with the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (and what to 
do about it),” KEStudies, 2: pages 1-9 at page 5. 
15 Olsen, K., 2005, Counterfeit and Piracy: Measurement Issues, Background Report for the 
WIPO/OECD Expert Meeting on Measurement and Statistical Issues, Geneva, 17-18 October 
2005, OECD. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/44/35651123.pdf 
16 Tekeste Biadgleng, E. and Munoz Tellez, V., op. cit., page 20. 
17 Olsen, K., op. cit. 
18 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1383/2003 of 22 July 2003 concerning customs action against 
goods suspected of infringing certain intellectual property rights and the measures to be taken 
against goods found to have infringed such rights, OJ L 196, 2 August 2003. Available at: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32003R1383:en:NOT 
Specifically, the Regulation: extends the scope of the former Regulation to cover more 
intellectual property rights such as plant variety rights, geographical indications, and 
designations of origin. 
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• Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property 
rights (19); 
 
• Proposal for a Council framework decision to strengthen the 
criminal law framework to combat intellectual property offences (20); 
 
• Council Resolution of 13 March 2006 on a customs response to 
latest trends in counterfeiting and piracy (21); 
 
• The European Parliament legislative resolution of 25 April 2007 on 
the draft of the Directive on criminal measures amended and 
clarified various provisions of the Directive (22); 
 
• The EU Strategy for the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights 
in Third Countries, prepared by Directorate General Trade of the 
European Commission (23). 
 
The EU Strategy for the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in Third 
Countries is the most significant EU initiative for the purposes of this briefing 
paper and, accordingly, the relevant section of the paper prepared by 
Directorate General Trade of the European Commission is quoted below since 
it sets out the approach to be taken to the enforcement on intellectual property 
rights in bilateral trade agreements:  
 
“The numerous bilateral agreements established by the European Community 
contain a chapter dedicated to IP. This chapter usually establishes that a very 
high standard of protection of IP (including enforcement thereof) must be 
achieved. Most agreements also include a clause allowing for technical 
cooperation in this field. These clauses must be carefully monitored and 
effectively implemented, notably with respect to the more ‘problematic’ 
countries. 
 
                                                 
19 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on 
the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, OJ L 157, 30 April 2004. Available at: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:157:0045:0086:EN:PDF 
20 {SEC(2005)848} COM(2005)276 final 12 July 2005. 
21 Council Resolution of 13 March 2006 on a customs response to latest trends in 
counterfeiting and piracy, OJ L 67, 18 March 2006. Available at: 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/c_067/c_06720060318en00010002.pdf 
22 European Parliament (2007) P6_TA(2007)0145, legislative resolution of 25 April 2007 on 
the amended proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
criminal measures aimed at ensuring the enforcement of intellectual property rights, first 
reading, which clarifies that the Directive does not apply to any infringement of an intellectual 
property right related to patents, utility models and supplementary protection certificates or to 
parallel imports of original goods which have been marketed with the agreement of a right 
holder in the third country. See also 22 European Parliament (2007) A6-0073/200 Report on 
the amended proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
criminal measures aimed at ensuring the enforcement of intellectual property rights, 
Committee on Legal Affairs, Amendment 11, Article 1, paragraph b. 
23 European Commission Directorate General for Trade (2004) EU Strategy for the 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in Third Countries, OJ C 129, 26 May 2005. 
Available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/april/tradoc_122636 
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“It is also envisaged to make the enforcement clauses in future bilateral or bi-
regional agreements more operational and to clearly define what the EU 
regards as the highest international standards in this area and what kinds of 
efforts it expects from its trading partners. 
 
“Specific actions [include]: …Revisit the approach to the IPR chapter of 
bilateral agreements, including the clarification and strengthening of the 
enforcement clauses [emphasis added]. Although in designing the rules for 
each specific negotiation it is important to take into account the situation and 
the capacity of our partners, instruments such as the new EU Directive 
harmonising the enforcement of IPR within the Community, as well as the new 
customs Regulation on counterfeit and pirated goods may constitute an 
important source of inspiration and a useful benchmark…Raise more 
systematically enforcement concerns at Summit meetings and in the 
Councils/Committees created in the framework of these bilateral agreements. 
In order to allow the Commission to obtain an effective reaction from its 
counterparts, it is essential that it receives credible and detailed information 
from right-holders, either directly or via the EC Delegation or the embassies of 
the Member States in the countries concerned” (24). 
 
The EU Strategy for the enforcement of intellectual property rights in third 
countries provides for several action areas that include: 
 
• periodically conducting surveys in order to develop a list of priority 
countries for the implementation of the strategy; 
 
• the possibility of launching an initiative in the TRIPS Council 
highlighting the fact that the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement 
requirements in national laws has proved to be insufficient to combat 
piracy and counterfeiting, and of considering possible amendments to 
the TRIPS Agreement so that countries apply border measures not 
only on imports but also on exports and transit trade; 
 
• full implementation and strengthening of bilateral customs co-operation 
agreements with China, the United States, Japan and other trading 
partners; 
 
• turning technical assistance from ‘demand-driven’ to ‘dialogue driven’ 
and, in the case of ‘production’ countries, shifting the focus in any 
cooperation programmes from assistance in drafting legislation to a 
more enforcement-oriented strategy, including training programmes for 
judges, police and customs. The strategy also aims at improving 
dialogue with international organisations to ensure that their technical 
assistance is compatible with the strategy for enforcement of 
intellectual property rights; 
 
• considering trade dispute settlement and sanctions within the WTO. 
 
                                                 
24 European Commission Directorate General for Trade (2004), op. cit., pages 5-6. 
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On 11 October 2005 the European Commission presented a package of 
measures to strengthen protection for the EU and its citizens against 
counterfeiting and piracy. The measures proposed would: 
 
• increase Community level protection through improved legislation 
and operational controls; 
 
• strengthen the customs/business partnership; and 
 
• reinforce international co-operation in this area (25). 
 
In 2005 the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee on a Customs 
Response to Latest Trends in Counterfeiting and Piracy elaborated how the 
clarification and strengthening of the enforcement clauses in the intellectual 
property rights chapter of bilateral trade agreements could be achieved. 
Recognising that EU controls relating to imports would only ever be a means 
of stopping individual consignments or tackling individual criminal sectors, the 
Communication noted that it is necessary to act at the source of the problem 
by, at the very least, stopping the export of counterfeit goods and, where 
possible, by shutting down the production (26). This, the Communication 
stated, requires international cooperation and, whilst the TRIPS minimum 
standards of intellectual property rights protection provides for controls on 
imports by customs, the Communication noted that EU Customs experience 
showed that more needs to be done (27). In this respect, the Communication 
set out five action points. 
 
Firstly, the enhancement of Article 51 the TRIPS Agreement by extending the 
present obligation for countries to apply customs anti-counterfeiting controls 
on imports to cover also controls on exports, transit and transhipment 
movements (28).  
 
Secondly, close, active co-operation with the most involved international 
enforcement bodies such as the WCO, Europol and Interpol could be used to 
both pick up international trends and help spread the EU’s practical approach 
to a broader audience (29). 
 
Thirdly, in relation to bilateral agreements, sharing practical tools (risk 
management guide, statistics, trends analysis etc.) developed in the EU with 
the EU’s trading partners in order to tackle counterfeiting in key problem 
areas. The Communication noted that Customs Co-operation Agreements and 
                                                 
25 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the 
European Economic and Social Committee on a Customs response to latest trends in 
counterfeiting and piracy COM(2005) 479 of 11 October 2005. 
26 COM2005 (479) final, op. cit., page12. 
27 Ibid., page 13. 
28 Ibid., page 13. The Communication also notes, at footnote 14, that the European 
Commission has already introduced this question before the TRIPS Council in June 2005, 
when it presented a Communication on the enforcement of intellectual property rights which 
stated in the Chapter describing the expected results that “among the issues that should be 
given special attention by the TRIPS Council should be…the customs measures and their 
availability for export and transit” (paragraph 26 of Commission Communication IP/C/W/448). 
29 Ibid., page 13. 
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Partnership and Co-operation Agreements with a mutual assistance 
component provide a legal basis to co-operate and exchange information. 
Examples of such co-operation given in the Communication were training, the 
exchange of officials, sharing expertise and latest trend information. The 
Communication also noted that the Commission will seek to include in the 
intellectual property rights chapter of future bilateral arrangements 
commitment for the parties to apply customs controls not only on imports but 
also on exports, transit and transhipment of goods infringing certain 
intellectual property rights (30). 
 
Fourthly, given that Chinese exports comprise the majority of all EU seizures 
of fakes, the recent Customs Co-operation Agreement between the EC and 
China was considered by the Communication to provide a legal framework for 
in-depth co-operation that could be utilised in other contexts. In particular, in 
addition to exchanging officials and expertise, the Communication noted that a 
specific information system through which the EU and China can exchange 
information to help stop illegal traffic and close down production would be a 
major practical step to reduce the international flows of fakes. If successful, 
the Communication noted, this approach could be extended to other key 
trading partners (31). 
 
Fifthly, the Communication noted that the EU/US declaration shows the clear 
intent of the US and the EU to work together to combat counterfeiting and 
piracy, and that taking this forward in practice implies fostering exchange of 
customs expertise and information under the existing EC-US Customs Co-
operation Agreement. The Communication suggested that it would also be 
desirable to see where the EU should join forces with other partners (32). 
 
Recently the European Parliament has also taken a close interest in 
counterfeiting and piracy in third countries. The European Parliament 
Resolution of 8 May 2008 on Trade and Economic Relations with the 
Association of East Asian Nations (ASEAN) gives priority to tackling pirated 
copyright goods and “[s]tresses the importance of IPRs and calls for their 
effective enforcement to be given priority, particularly for design, sound 
recordings and other cultural goods as well as geographical indications and 
appellations of origin” [and] ”asks the Commission to tackle barriers 
notwithstanding the right of countries to regulate sectors - such as audiovisual 
- that play a key role in preserving cultural diversity” (33). 
 
Enforcement of intellectual property rights under the TRIPS Agreement  
 
The WTO TRIPS Agreement: enforcement provisions 
 
Part III of the TRIPS Agreement requires the domestic laws of all WTO 
Members to be in compliance with the provisions on enforcement of 
                                                 
30 Ibid., page 14. 
31 Ibid., page 14 
32 Ibid., page 14. 
33 European Parliament Resolution of 8 May 2008 on Trade and Economic Relations with the 
Association of East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-
398.447+01+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN 
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intellectual property rights. Part III of the TRIPS Agreement established 
minimum standards in respect of national measures and procedures for the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights that can be summarised in the 
following three categories: 
 
• civil proceedings such as injunctions, damages, evidence, right of 
information and provisional measures, must be available to right 
holders; 
 
• criminal proceedings for commercial scale trademark and copyright 
infringement; 
 
• border measures to prevent the commercialisation of imported products 
that infringe trademarks and copyrights. 
 
However, TRIPS only establishes minimum standards to be implemented 
according to the mechanism determined by each Member. The TRIPS 
Agreement does not attempt to harmonise procedural rules for enforcement of 
intellectual property rights. The TRIPS Agreement left room for countries to 
utilise in-built flexibilities. One of the most significant flexibilities is the freedom 
of WTO Members to determine for themselves the method of implementing 
the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, including procedures for the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights. 
 
The scope and applicability of the enforcement provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement are also complicated by the fact that, as explained earlier in this 
paper, some provisions of Part III of TRIPS only apply to certain types of 
intellectual property rights. The availability of procedures for border measures 
and criminal sanctions under Articles 51 to 61 apply only to “counterfeit 
trademark or pirated copyright goods” as defined under footnote 14 of Article 
51 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
 
The definition provides several elements of what constitute “counterfeit 
trademark goods” and “copyright piracy”. First, counterfeit goods shall mean 
goods bearing a trademark identical to, or that cannot be distinguished in its 
essential aspects from, the validly registered trademark. Pirated goods shall 
mean copies of the copyrighted material or copies made directly or indirectly 
from an article. Secondly, the goods are to be considered counterfeit or 
pirated only where the use of the trademark was without authorisation and the 
reproduction of the copyright material was without the consent of the right 
holder or person duly authorised by the right holder in the country of 
production. Third, the definitions clearly provide that the existence of 
infringement is to be determined by the law of the country of importation. 
 
Similarly, according to Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement, Members must 
provide criminal procedures and penalties, at least, for cases of “wilful 
trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale”. 
 
Failure of a WTO Member to meet its TRIPS Agreement obligations regarding 
intellectual property rights enforcement can lead to a request for consultations 
under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. 
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On 10 April 2007, the United States requested consultations with China 
concerning certain measures pertaining to the protection and enforcement of 
intellectual property rights in China (34). The European Communities are a 
third party in this dispute. 
The four matters on which the United States requested consultations were:  
• the thresholds that must be met in order for certain acts of trademark 
counterfeiting and copyright piracy to be subject to criminal procedures 
and penalties; 
    
• goods that infringe intellectual property rights that are confiscated by 
Chinese customs authorities, in particular the disposal of such goods 
following removal of their infringing features; 
    
• the scope of coverage of criminal procedures and penalties for 
unauthorized reproduction or unauthorized distribution of copyrighted 
works; and 
    
• the denial of copyright and related rights protection and enforcement to 
creative works of authorship, sound recordings and performances that 
have not been authorized for publication or distribution within China.  
Enforcement of intellectual property rights under bilateral trade 
agreements 
 
Due to the blocked Doha talks in the WTO, bilateral trade agreements are 
becoming more and more common. The EU has initiated negotiations on 
bilateral trade agreements with a number of trading partners such as Korea 
(35), India (36), and ASEAN (37), while the initiation of negotiations on bilateral 
trade with Ukraine (38) and Russia (39) are also being considered. 
                                                 
34 WTO Dispute Settlement Dispute DS362 China – Measures affecting the protection and 
enforcement of intellectual property rights. Request for consultations received 10 April 2007. 
Summary of the dispute available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds362_e.htm 
35 In May 2007 the Commission sought to facilitate EU trade with the Republic of Korea 
(South-Korea) by launching negotiations for an EU-South-Korea Free Trade Agreement 
(FTA). Bilaterally, the EU and South-Korea expect to promote bilateral trade through the 
prospective FTA, notwithstanding ongoing expert level co-operation in order to remove 
existing and prevent new trade barriers especially with regard to the preparation and 
application of requirements to products or services or protection of intellectual property rights. 
Source:  
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/korea/index_en.htm 
36 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/india/index_en.htm 
37 A continuous negotiation in Joint Committee for The ASEAN-EU Free Trade Agreement is 
being carried out. Last negotiation was held in Brussels, Belgium from 30 January until 1 
February 2008. Source: http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=11687 
38 In March 2007 the EU and Ukraine launched bilateral negotiations of a new Enhanced 
Agreement that will replace the present PCA and will include a deep and comprehensive 
bilateral trade agreement as a core element. However, the negotiations of the bilateral trade 
agreements elements of the new Agreement were only to due start once Ukraine completed 
its WTO accession process, which occurred on 16 May 2008. This has been preceded by 
technical preparations for the negotiations on both sides. Source:  
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/ukraine/index_en.htm 
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Provisions on the enforcement of intellectual property rights in bilateral trade 
agreements would allow the EU to by-pass the multilateral trading system and 
to consolidate key elements of multilateral intellectual property rights treaties 
by targeting specific countries where there are particular concerns about 
counterfeiting and piracy. Commentators on the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights in bilateral trade agreements have summarised possible 
measures as including one or more of the following: 
 
• provisions that extend coverage of intellectual property rights to new 
areas not addressed by the TRIPS Agreement, and the requirement for 
accession to, or the ratification of, WIPO-administered treaties that 
include intellectual property enforcement provisions, and the UPOV 
Convention 1991; 
 
• provisions that change the flexibilities contained in provisions of the 
TRIPS Agreement on intellectual property rights enforcement to 
mandatory obligations; 
 
• provisions that extend the scope of enforcement and require wider use 
of the criminal justice system to tackle intellectual property rights 
violations as a deterrent to possible future infringements; 
 
• provisions in the dispute settlement chapters of bilateral trade 
agreements that explicitly establish non-violation and situation 
complaints; 
 
• definitions of “investment” in the Investment chapters of bilateral trade 
agreements that include intellectual property rights as investment 
assets (40). 
 
Intellectual property as “investment” in bilateral trade agreements 
 
The inclusion of intellectual property rights in the definition of “investment” in 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) reflects the importance of protecting such 
intangible assets in many investment operations, considering intellectual 
property to be a significant strategic asset. 
 
The effect of having intellectual property included in the definition of 
investment is that it could potentially subject intellectual property to general 
guarantees afforded to investors under the BIT. These include protection in 
                                                                                                                                            
39 The Roadmap on the Common Economic Space was adopted at the EU-Russia Summit in 
Moscow on 10 May 2005. The document sets out a number of principles and priority 
activities. It also sets up various dialogues on specific issues, including IPR Dialogue.  
Enforcement of intellectual property rights is the central focus point of the dialogue, which 
fosters closer cooperation of customs, police, administrative and judiciary bodies to ensure 
that right-holders benefit from effective protection of their rights. It also encompasses 
exchange of information on strategies to fight against counterfeiting and piracy. Source:  
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/russia/index_en.htm 
40 Tekeste Biadgleng, E. and Munoz Tellez, V., op. cit., page 31. See also Shabalala, D. 
Intellectual Property in European Union Economic Partnership Agreements with the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific Countries: What way Forward after the Cariforum EPA and the interim 
EPAs?, April 2008, Center for International Environmental Law, Geneva. 
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the case of expropriation, national treatment and most-favoured nation (MFN) 
treatment among others. Furthermore, including intellectual property in the 
definition of investment could provide a legal basis to foreign investors for a 
cause of action against the host country for failing to protect their intellectual 
property (41). 
 
An example of a BIT that includes intellectual property rights as investment 
assets is the US BIT with Uruguay (2004, as amended), which provides the 
following definition of investment: 
 
“investment means every asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or 
indirectly, that has the characteristics of an investment…Forms that an 
investment may take include: 
… 
(f) intellectual property rights;” 
 
Unlike BITs, preferential trade and investment treaties (such as free trade 
agreements, regional trade agreements, economic framework agreements 
and economic partnership agreements) tend to include specific intellectual 
property chapters that contain substantive obligations to be borne by 
contracting parties (42). 
 
Although free trade agreements of the US and the EU both contain TRIPS-
plus provisions, there are significant differences in their overall approaches to 
intellectual property rights. The agreements to which the US is a party 
generally have an entire chapter on intellectual property and include specific 
provisions on enforcement. 
 
For instance, US free trade agreements with Australia, Bahrain, Chile, 
Colombia, Morocco, Jordan, Oman and Singapore, as well as the Central 
American-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) all have 
specific provisions on intellectual property rights and include obligations on 
enforcement of those rights. 
 
Free trade agreements to which the EU is a party tend to have more limited 
provisions on intellectual property and exclude specific obligations on 
enforcement of intellectual property rights. Generally free trade agreements to 
which the EU is a party require an adequate and effective protection of 
intellectual property rights in accordance with the “highest international 
standards, including effective means to enforce such rights” (43). They also 
tend to focus on particular issues such as geographical indications and 
protection of plant varieties, while there are sometimes separate agreements 
                                                 
41 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (2007) Intellectual 
Property Provisions in International Investment Arrangements, International Investment 
Agreements Monitor No. 1, UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/2007/1, page 3. Available at:  
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_pcbb/docs/webiteiia20071_en.pdf 
42 Ibid., page 5. 
43 See, for example, Article 168 of the Association Agreement between the European Union 
and Chile provides that: “The Parties shall grant and ensure adequate and effective protection 
of intellectual property rights in accordance with the highest international standards, including 
effective means of enforcing such rights provided for in international treaties.” Available at: 
http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/chieu_e/cheuin_e.asp 
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specifically relating to wines and spirits (44). Overall, the treatment of 
intellectual property rights in the EU agreements has not been as extensive as 
the provisions of US bilateral trade agreements and the specific provisions on 
intellectual property rights enforcement found in US agreements have not 
been found in comparable agreements to which the EU is a party. 
 
Dispute settlement mechanisms in bilateral trade agreements 
 
Bilateral trade agreements to which the EU is a party provide recourse to 
dispute settlement mechanisms established in the agreements (45). Dispute 
settlement can be triggered in cases of the non-compliance with the required 
“highest” standards of intellectual property rights protection. 
 
However there are concerns that, on the promise of reciprocal concessions, 
developing countries are entering into bilateral trade agreements whereby 
they assume “TRIPS-plus” obligations with respect to intellectual property 
rights to which they are effectively bound under the dispute settlement 
mechanism of the bilateral agreement. In this respect bilateral trade 
agreements are perceived as weakening the multilateral dispute settlement 
system by limiting the flexibility of developing countries to regulate intellectual 
property rights according to the development priorities of each country that are 
permitted under the TRIPS Agreement (46). 
 
In the case of Decision 2/2000 of the EC-Mexico Joint Council, an 
independent Consultation Mechanism for Intellectual Property Matters is 
provided “with a view to reaching mutually satisfactory solutions to difficulties 
arising in the protection of intellectual property” (47). Decision 2/2000 defines 
“protection” as including the maintenance and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights as well as those matters affecting the use of intellectual 
property rights (48). 
 
                                                 
44 UNCTAD, op. cit., page 6. 
45 See, for example, Article 182(1) of the Association Agreement between the European 
Union and Chile which provides that: “The Parties shall at all times endeavour to agree on the 
interpretation and application of this Part of the Agreement and shall make every attempt 
through cooperation and consultations to avoid and settle disputes between them and to 
arrive at a mutually satisfactory resolution of any matter that might affect its operation.” 
46 See, for example, Tekeste Biadgleng, E. and Munoz Tellez, V., op. cit., page 30. 
47 Article 40(1) of Decision 2/2000 of the EC-Mexico Joint Council of 23 March 2000 
(2000/415/EC) provides that: “The Joint Council hereby establishes a Special Committee on 
Intellectual Property Matters. The Special Committee shall be comprised of representatives of 
the Parties. The Special Committee shall be convened within 30 days following a request of 
either Party with a view to reaching mutually satisfactory solutions to difficulties arising in the 
protection of intellectual property. The office of Chairman of the Committee shall be held 
alternatively by each of the Parties. The Special Committee shall report to the Joint 
Committee.” OJ L 157, 30 June 2000. Available at:  
http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/MEX_EU/English/Decisions_Council/2_2000_e.pdf 
48 Ibid., Article 40(2) of Decision 2/2000 of the EC-Mexico Joint Council of 23 March 2000 
(2000/415/EC) provides that: “For the purposes of paragraph 1, ‘protection’ shall include 
matters affecting the availability, acquisition, scope, maintenance, and enforcement of 
intellectual property rights as well as those matters affecting the use of intellectual property 
rights.” 
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The dispute settlement chapters in US bilateral trade agreements tend to go 
further than those of the EU by establishing the application of non-violation 
and situation complaints that are suspended under the TRIPS Agreement (49). 
 
Disputes in the WTO generally involve allegations that a country has violated 
an agreement or broken a commitment. But in some situations a government 
can go to the Dispute Settlement Body even when an agreement has not 
been violated. This is called a non-violation complaint. It is allowed if one 
government can show that it has been deprived of an expected benefit 
because of another government’s action, or because of any other situation 
that exists (50). 
 
The aim is to help preserve the balance of benefits struck during multilateral 
negotiations. For example, a country may have agreed to reduce its tariff on a 
product as part of a market access deal, but later subsidised domestic 
production so that the effect on the conditions of competition are the same as 
the original tariff. A non-violation case against this country would be allowed to 
restore the conditions of competition implied in the original deal. 
 
Non-violation complaints are possible for goods and services (under GATT for 
goods and market-opening commitments in services). However, for the time 
being, members have agreed not to use them under the TRIPS Agreement. 
Under Article 64.2 of the TRIPS Agreement this “moratorium” (i.e. the 
agreement not to use TRIPS non-violation cases) was to last for the first five 
years of the WTO (i.e. 1995–99). It has been extended since then. 
 
At the same time, the TRIPS Council has discussed whether non-violation 
complaints should be allowed in intellectual property, and if so, to what extent 
and how (“scope and modalities”) they could be brought to the WTO’s dispute 
settlement procedures. 
 
At least two countries (the US and Switzerland) say non-violation cases 
should be allowed in order to discourage members from engaging in “creative 
legislative activity” that would allow them to get around their TRIPS 
commitments. Most would like to see the moratorium continued or made 
permanent. Some have suggested additional safeguards. 
   
EU-US Action Strategy on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property 
Rights 
 
The EU-US Vienna Summit Declaration 21 June 2006 defined intellectual 
property rights enforcement as one of their core areas of transatlantic 
                                                 
49 See, for instance, Annex 22.2(1) of the Free Trade Agreement between the Government of 
the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Chile provides that: “If 
either Party considers that any benefit it could reasonably have expected to accrue to it under 
any provision of: 
… 
(e) Chapter Seventeen (Intellectual Property Rights), is being nullified or impaired as a result 
of the application of any measure that is not inconsistent with this Agreement, the Party may 
have recourse to dispute settlement under this Chapter.” Available at:  
http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/chiusa_e/Text3_e.asp#22.2 
50 “TRIPS: ‘Non-Violation’ Complaints (Article 64.2). Background and the current situation.” 
Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/TRIPS_e/nonviolation_background_e.htm 
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cooperation (51) and the EU and US have begun to undertake bilateral 
customs activities to combat counterfeiting and piracy. On 22 February 2008 
DG TAXUD of the European Commission and US Customs and Border 
Protection announced the results of Operation Infrastructure, which took place 
in November/December 2007 and resulted in the seizure of over 360,000 
counterfeit integrated circuits bearing over 40 different trademarks (52). This 
was the first intellectual property rights enforcement operation undertaken by 
the EU and US Customs and Border Protection. 
 
G8 Initiative on Combating Piracy and Counterfeiting 
 
At the 2006 G8 meeting in St. Petersburg, a comprehensive intellectual 
property rights enforcement strategy was announced that delivered upon the 
strategy adopted in the G8 Gleneagles Statement on “Reducing IPR Piracy 
and Counterfeiting through more Effective Enforcement” (July 2005). The G8 
2006 Statement on “Combating Intellectual Property Rights Piracy and 
Counterfeiting” had the following objectives: 
 
• to keep the spotlight on trade in counterfeit and pirated goods and 
secure agreement on projects that promote greater cooperation among 
national law enforcement and customs officials; 
 
• to link victims of intellectual property rights infringement to national 
enforcement authorities; 
 
• to build capacity in developing countries to combat trade in counterfeit 
and pirated goods; 
 
• to conduct further research into the economic impact of piracy and 
counterfeiting on national economies, brands, rights holders and public 
health/safety; 
 
• to refer relevant law enforcement work (including online piracy) to the 
Lyon-Roma Anti-Crime and Terrorism Group (LR/ACT). 
 
Subsequently, at the G8 Summit in June 2007, members agreed to: 
 
• endorse the Guidelines for Customs and Border Enforcement 
Cooperation designed to strengthen cooperation and coordination 
among national customs and law enforcement administrations; 
 
                                                 
51 “We endorse the new Action Strategy on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights 
against piracy and counterfeiting. Implementation has already started with concrete action 
aimed at promoting strong and effective enforcement in third countries, strengthening 
cooperation to reduce global piracy and counterfeiting, and offering public-private 
partnerships to protect intellectual property. We will enhance our dialogue to promote a more 
efficient international patent system.” Source: EU-US Vienna Summit Declaration 21 June 
2006, page 7. Available at:  
http://www.eu2006.at/includes/Download_Dokumente/2106EUUSDeclaration.pdf 
52 U.S. Customs and Border Protection and European Commission Announce First Joint 
Operation Combating Counterfeit Goods, Press Release 22 February 2008. 
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• endorse new Guidelines for Technical Assistance on intellectual 
property rights protection to interested developing countries, as well as 
mechanisms to better coordinate and leverage existing G8 assistance 
to such countries with a view to building the capacity necessary to 
combat trade in counterfeited and pirated goods to strengthen 
intellectual property enforcement; 
 
• endorse the recommendations aimed at improving G8 member 
countries’ cooperative actions to combat serious and organised 
intellectual property rights crimes and the further work on their basis to 
facilitate structured international cooperation regarding the investigation 
and prosecution of these crimes; 
 
• in the light of the OECD report estimating the economic impacts of 
counterfeiting and piracy on national economies and rights holders, as 
well as public health and safety, encourage the OECD to work with 
member states to further identify and target in its report specific areas 
for concrete actions; 
 
• recognise the need for continued study of the possibilities of 
strengthening the international legal framework pertaining to intellectual 
property rights enforcement; 
 
• consider the establishment of an IPR Task Force focusing on anti-
counterfeiting and piracy to look together at how best to improve the 
working of the international intellectual property rights protection and 
enforcement, and produce recommendations for action including 
improved peer review (53). 
  
Proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
 
The G8 Gleneagles Statement on “Reducing IPR Piracy and Counterfeiting 
through more Effective Enforcement” has been attributed as being the start of 
the process leading to proposals for an Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(ACTA) (54). 
 
On 23 October 2007, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, the European 
Commission and the USTR each announced their intention to bring about “a 
new international legal framework to strengthen the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights” in the form of an Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(ACTA). 
 
According to sources, the USTR has pointed out that the agreement would not 
involve changes to the TRIPS Agreement; rather, the goal was to set a new, 
higher benchmark for enforcement that countries could join on a voluntary 
basis and negotiations would not be conducted as part of any international 
                                                 
53 Summit Declaration, Growth and Responsibility in the World Economy, 7 June 2007, G8 
Summit Heiligendamm. Available at: http://www.g-8.de/Content/EN/Artikel/__g8-
summit/anlagen/2007-06-07-gipfeldokument-wirtschaft-
eng,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/2007-06-07-gipfeldokument-wirtschaft-eng 
54 Shaw , A., op. cit., page 2. 
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organisation.55 The reasoning of the USTR is that a new treaty is needed to 
address the worldwide proliferation of counterfeit and pirated products poses 
an ever-increasing threat not only to sustainable economic development but 
also to consumers’ health and safety. Moreover, the USTR asserts that new 
issues have been emerging rapidly on a global scale, such as the violation of 
intellectual property rights through the trading of counterfeit goods over the 
Internet. 
 
However, concerns have been raised that the ACTA would impose a narrow 
trade agenda at the expense of global cooperation and evidence-based 
policies, criminalising non-commercial copyright and trademark infringements, 
reinforcing Digital Rights Management (DRM) technologies contrary to fair use 
principles in copyright law, and protecting Internet Service Providers (ISPs) 
from liability for the actions of their subscribers (56). 
 
There are further concerns that the ACTA would require signatories to 
undertake an unprecedented expansion of customs and law enforcement 
officials’ abilities to police goods and information, and that it would create a 
dispute settlement system outside of existing multilateral institutions such as 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure to enforce these new obligations (57). 
 
WIPO and intellectual property rights enforcement 
 
The WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) include specific intellectual property rights 
enforcement provisions. These provisions require members to “ensure that 
enforcement procedures are available under their law so as to permit effective 
action against any act of infringement of rights covered by this Treaty, 
including expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and remedies which 
constitute a deterrent to further infringements” (58). 
 
In addition to enforcement provisions of the WCT and WPPT, the WIPO has 
an Advisory Committee on Enforcement (ACE) which was established in 2002 
to structure discussions on enforcement of intellectual property rights and to 
discuss and share national experiences on intellectual property enforcement. 
The establishment of the ACE merged the Advisory Committee on 
Enforcement of Industrial Property Rights and the Advisory Committee on 
Management and Enforcement of Copyright and Related Rights in Global 
Information networks into a single forum (59). The mandate of the ACE is 
limited to discussions on technical assistance and coordination does not 
include norm-setting in the field of enforcement. To date the focus of ACE has 
been on strengthening the enforcement of intellectual property rights and the 
problems right holders face in enforcing their rights in third countries. 
 
                                                 
55 Tekeste Biadgleng, E. and Munoz Tellez, V., op. cit., page 25. 
56 Shaw, A., op. cit. page 3. 
57 Shaw, A., op. cit, page 4. 
58 Article 14(2) WCT and Article 23(2) WPPT.  
59 WIPO (2003), WIPO/ACE/1/7/ Rev., paragraph 7. 
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Following adoption of the Development Agenda by the WIPO General 
Assembly in October 2007 (60), the ACE is now required to examine the 
development dimension of intellectual property enforcement and technical 
assistance and consider such issues as competition and transfer of 
technology in relation to enforcement. 
 
Specifically, the Development Agenda requires the WIPO “to approach 
intellectual property enforcement in the context of broader societal interests 
and especially development-oriented concerns…in a manner conducive to 
societal and economic welfare and the balance of rights and obligations in 
accordance with Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement” (61). 
 
Since the WIPO is the main multilateral intellectual property-related technical 
assistance provider to developing countries, the principles and guidelines 
established under the Development Agenda may also result in pressure on 
the WIPO to tailor technical assistance to be more development oriented, 
demand-driven, transparent and country-specific. 
 
Bilateral intellectual property-related technical assistance 
 
In order to facilitate enforcement of intellectual property rights, bilateral 
agreements established by the EU usually contain, alongside an obligation to 
establish a high standard of protection of intellectual property rights, a 
provision allowing for technical cooperation in this field. The EU Strategy for 
the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in Third Countries states that 
these clauses must be carefully monitored and effectively implemented, 
notably with respect to the more “problematic” countries (62) .  
 
Under the TRIPS Agreement, Article 67 of TRIPS provides that developed 
countries shall provide, on mutually agreed terms and conditions, technical 
and financial cooperation in favour of developing and least-developed country 
Members. Analysis of the notifications of technical assistance undertaken 
under Article 67 submitted to TRIPS Council by the United States, Japan and 
the European Communities has demonstrated that strengthening the capacity 
of developing countries to enforce the protection of intellectual property rights 
has been the main technical assistance provided bilaterally, although the 
European Communities have also engaged in development-oriented activities 
regarding utilisation of TRIPS flexibilities (63). 
 
                                                 
60 The General Assembly of the WIPO agreed to adopt immediately the 45 proposals for a 
Development Agenda. See Assemblies of the Member States of WIPO, Forty Third Series of 
Meetings, Geneva 27 September to 3 October 2007, General Report, A/43/25, page 151, 
paragraph 334. Available at: 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/govbody/en/a_43/a_43_16-main1.pdf 
61 Ibid., page 157, Annex A, paragraph 45. See also Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement which 
provides that: “The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute 
to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of 
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and 
in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and 
obligations.” Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.doc 
62 European Commission Directorate General for Trade (2004), op. cit., page 6. 
63 Matthews, D. and Munoz Tellez, V., 2006, “Bilateral Technical Assistance and TRIPS: the 
United States, Japan and the European Communities in Comparative Perspective”, Journal of 
World Intellectual Property, Vol. 9, No. 6, pages 629-653. 
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World Customs Organisation 
 
Customs administrations can play an important role in combating 
counterfeiting and piracy. The role of customs administrations in fighting 
counterfeiting and piracy in international trade has been discussed in various 
fora at the international level, notably the WTO, the WIPO and the World 
Customs Organization (WCO). The WCO is an international organisation 
representing 171 customs administrations with a mandate to undertake 
dialogue and exchange of experiences between national customs authorities. 
It is a significant provider of technical assistance to customs administrations. 
 
Recently, however, the WCO has gone beyond its information exchange and 
technical assistance activities, with the WCO Standards Employed by 
Customs for Uniform Rights Enforcement (SECURE) Working Group 
developing “Model Provisions for National Legislation to Implement Fair and 
Effective Border Measures Consistent with the TRIPS Agreement” (64). 
 
In fact, despite the above statement, far from being consistent with the TRIPS 
Agreement, the Model Provisions contain significant TRIPS-plus elements 
(65). The introductory section to the Model Provisions explains that “[t]he 
experience of customs administrations in numerous countries has indicated, 
however, that only by granting certain powers and measures that go beyond 
the minimum requirement set forth in the TRIPS Agreement, Governments 
can provide an effective and efficient level of IPR protection and enforcement 
at their borders.” 
The WCO Model Provisions include the following TRIPS-plus measures: 
• a definition of infringing goods to be subject to border measures that 
exceeds the definitions of “counterfeiting” and “piracy” contained in 
Article 51, footnote 14, of the TRIPS Agreement and in particular would 
place significant burdens on customs in relation to patent infringements 
(66); 
• customs to have the ability to suspend counterfeit and pirated goods 
destined for export and goods which are in transit (67); 
• specific time limit of 30 days for handling applications to customs for 
suspension of import, export, or transit of infringing goods and a shorter 
time limit of 3 days with respect to applications concerning specific 
shipments, in contrast to Article 52 of the TRIPS Agreement which 
                                                 
64 Available at: http://www.wcoipr.org/wcoipr/gfx/ModelLawfinal.doc. 
65 See also Munoz Tellez, V., 2008, “The World Customs Organisation: Setting New 
Standards of Intellectual Property Enforcement through the Back Door?” South Bulletin: 
Reflections and Foresights, Issue 13, South Centre, Geneva, page 6. Available at:  
http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=592&Itemid=105 
66 The WCO Model Provisions would apply to any goods which are made, reproduced, put 
into circulation or otherwise used in breach of intellectual property laws and without the 
consent of the right holder or a person duly authorised to do so by the right holder. Intellectual 
property rights are to be such rights as defined in the national laws such as copyright and 
related rights, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, layout-
designs (topographies) of integrated circuits and protection of undisclosed information. 
67 The WCO Model Provisions give the following examples covered by the definition of transit: 
1. Goods that reside in a Customs controlled area in a port or airport. 
2. Goods that are under Customs procedures, such as inward processing, outward 
processing, period entry, and various simplified procedures. 
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requires only that authorities reply to the applicant within a reasonable 
period, while Article 41 of the TRIPS Agreement sets a general 
obligation that enforcement procedures shall not entail unreasonable 
time limits or unwarranted delays. 
Despite the Model Provisions, the WCO is seen as lacking the authority to set 
or enforce policies that contradict the WTO, with the effect that SECURE 
would hold little more than symbolic value (68). It is recommended that the 
SECURE Working Group should play a limited role in elaborating international 
standards on border measures related to enforcement of intellectual property 
rights and focus instead on training and capacity building for customs officials. 
 
WHO International Medicinal Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce 
(IMPACT) 
 
The WHO International Medicinal Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce 
(IMPACT), created in 2006, has also been active in forging international 
collaboration to seek global solutions to this global challenge and in raising 
awareness of the dangers of counterfeit medical products. IMPACT aims to 
build coordinated networks between countries in order to halt the production, 
trading and selling of fake medicines around the globe. IMPACT is to help to 
identify and coordinate action between customs, police and the judiciary of 
different countries to monitor borders, track counterfeit goods and apprehend 
counterfeiters. 
 
By working with the World Customs Agency, Interpol, and through informal 
networks of enforcement officers, IMPACT is intended to facilitate 
communication between enforcement and health authorities, improve 
international collaboration and develop appropriate mechanisms that will 
enable importing countries, especially in the developing world, to trigger 
investigation and identification of the actual source of counterfeit medicines 
plaguing their markets (69). The IMPACT website notes that: “counterfeit 
medical products are a major public health risk for all communities. The 
phenomenon has grown in recent years due to counterfeiting methods 
becoming more sophisticated and to the increasing amount of merchandise 
crossing borders” (70). 
 
According to IMPACT, counterfeiting of medicines is greater in those regions 
where regulatory and legal oversight is weaker, and therefore: 
 
• most developed countries with effective regulatory systems and 
market control (e.g. USA, EU, Australia, Canada, Japan, New 
Zealand) currently have a very low proportion, i.e. less than 1% of 
market value; 
 
• many developing countries in Africa, parts of Asia, and parts of 
Latin America have areas where more than 30% of the medicines 
on sale can be counterfeit. Other developing countries, however, 
                                                 
68 Shaw, A., op. cit., page 3. 
69 Counterfeit Medicines, World Health Organisation Fact Sheet No. 275, revised 14 
November 2006, available at: http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs275/en/index.html 
70 WHO International Medicinal Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce (IMPACT) website. 
Available at: http://www.who.int/impact/en/ 
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have less than 10% overall, a reasonable estimate for all 
developing countries is therefore between 10% and 30%; 
 
• many of the former Soviet republics have a proportion of counterfeit 
medicines which is above 20% of market value – this falls into the 
developing country range; However other sources estimate that the 
real figure could be much higher; 
 
• medicines purchased over the internet from sites that conceal their 
actual physical address are counterfeit in over 50% of cases (71). 
 
In relation to specific countries, IMPACT reports that: 
 
• the Russian Federal Service for Health Sphere Supervision 
(FSHSS) reported that 10% of all drugs on the Russian market were 
counterfeit; 
 
• China’s Research and Development-based Pharmaceutical 
Association estimated that about 8% of over-the-counter drugs sold 
in China were counterfeit. 
 
• Indian pharmaceutical companies have suggested that in India’s 
major cities, one in five strips of medicines sold is fake. They claim 
a loss in revenue of between 4% and 5% annually. The industry 
also estimates that spurious drugs have grown from 10% to 20% of 
the total market (72). 
 
The US Strategy on Targeting Organised Piracy (STOP!) 
 
The United States launched the Strategy Targeting Organized Piracy (STOP!) 
initiative in October 2004. The strategy aims at engaging trading partners in 
increasing efforts to seize counterfeit goods at United States borders, 
pursuing criminal enterprises involved in piracy and counterfeiting (73). The 
Department of Justice of the United States has developed a “comprehensive, 
multi-dimensional strategy to fight intellectual property crime”, which includes 
the following principles: 
 
• laws protecting intellectual property rights must be enforced; 
 
• government and intellectual property owners have a collective 
responsibility to take action against violations of intellectual property 
rights laws; 
 
• the Department should take a leading role in the prosecution of the 
most serious violations of the laws protecting copyrights, marks, 
and trade secrets; 
 
                                                 
71 IMPACT fact sheet: Counterfeit Medicines: an update on estimates (15 November 2006), 
available at: 
http://www.who.int/medicines/services/counterfeit/impact/TheNewEstimatesCounterfeit.pdf 
72 Ibid. 
73 United States National Intellectual Property Law Enforcement Coordination Council (2006). 
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• government should punish the misappropriation of innovative 
technologies rather than innovation itself; 
 
• intellectual property rights enforcement must include the 
coordinated and cooperative efforts of foreign governments through 
informal assistance and formal cooperation, such as treaties and 
international agreements (74). 
 
As part of STOP!, both the USTR and the State Department are actively 
promoting the adoption of best practices, sharing information, streamlining 
procedures and strengthening technical assistance efforts for enforcement 
internationally. These efforts include new initiatives in multilateral forums to 
improve global intellectual property rights environment, such as the G8, the 
United States-European Union Summit, the OECD, the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) forum and the Security and Prosperity Partnership 
(Canada and Mexico) (75). 
 
The intellectual property enforcement strategy of Interpol 
 
Interpol has established a new unit on intellectual property crime to deal 
specifically with intellectual property infringements that may be connected to 
terrorist and other criminal activities. Interpol considers “[tr]ademark 
counterfeiting and copyright piracy [to be] serious Intellectual Property (IP) 
crimes that defraud consumers, threaten the health of patients, cost society 
billions of dollars in lost government revenues, foreign investments or 
business profits and violate the rights of trademark, patent, and copyright 
owners” (76). 
 
The role of rights holders in intellectual property enforcement 
 
Intellectual property rights are conferred on individuals by law and the 
enforcement of these rights remains primarily the responsibility of the private 
rights holder. The role of national governments is in assisting a rights holder in 
enforcing their rights but the onus lies with the rights holders themselves to 
assume the initiative and costs associated with enforcing their private rights 
through national courts. This approach is in accordance with the recent 
statement of Internal Market Commissioner McCreevy that more regulation is 
not the answer and that industry should lead the battle against counterfeiting 
and piracy (77). 
 
There are concerns that intellectual property rights holders, especially large 
companies, are demanding further government-led efforts for strengthening 
intellectual property right protection rather than these rights holders 
themselves taking the lead by bringing enforcement actions before national 
                                                 
74 United States Department of Justice (2006), Progress Report of the Department of Justice’s 
Task Force on Intellectual Property, pp. 15-16. Available at: 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/ipreport61906.pdf 
75 Tekeste Biadgleng, E. and Munoz Tellez, V., op. cit., page 18. 
76 See Interpol Intellectual Property Crime website. Available at: 
http://www.interpol.int/public/financialcrime/intellectualproperty/default.asp 
77 Standeford, D. “EU Internal Market Chief: Counterfeiting and Piracy Need Industry-Led 
Solutions”, Intellectual Property Watch, 14 May 2008. 
 26
courts. As a result, there are fears that developing countries are facing 
increased pressure to enhance their efforts on the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights. 
 
Developed countries have sought to make use of criminal law as a deterrent 
to infringement, but such use may work against the intellectual property 
system itself by creating public resentment. Police raids and the use of 
criminal law enforcement mechanisms require extensive use of public funds. 
For developing countries this may entail diverting resources away from other 
law enforcement priorities. Yet there are other means, particularly recourse to 
civil law, that may be strengthened to allow private parties to enforce their 
rights and which do not require extensive use of public funds.  
 
Developing countries retain the discretion under the TRIPS Agreement to 
determine for themselves the most appropriate enforcement policies and 
procedures based on the public interest and the capacity of government 
agencies. However this policy space is in danger of being eroded by bilateral 
trade agreements that include provisions requiring the increased pressure to 
use the state machinery to reduce the cost of private enforcement. 
 
The role of the European Parliament in the conclusion of provisions on 
enforcement of intellectual property rights bilateral trade agreements 
 
If the Lisbon Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) comes 
into force, the European Parliament will have a significantly enhanced role to 
play in the negotiation of trade agreements, including the power of veto over 
such agreements (78). This will give the Parliament significant influence over 
the content of provisions in agreements relating to the commercial aspects of 
intellectual property, including measures to fight counterfeiting and piracy in 
third countries. This enhanced role for the European Parliament will arise for a 
number of reasons. 
 
Firstly, if the TFEU comes into force, the EU will have exclusive competence 
in relation to common commercial policy (79), including the conclusion of tariff 
and trade agreements relating to the commercial aspects of intellectual 
property (together with goods, services and investment) (80). 
 
Secondly, if the TFEU comes into force, measures defining the framework for 
implementing the common commercial policy will be adopted by the European 
Parliament and the Council (81), acting by means of regulations in accordance 
with the ordinary legislative procedure (the co-decision procedure under the 
EC Treaty) (82). The adoption of measures defining the framework for 
implementing the common commercial policy by the European Parliament and 
the Council by means of the ordinary legislative procedure will offer an 
                                                 
78 See also Leal-Arcas, R., (2008) Theory and Practice of EC External Trade Law and Policy, 
Cameron May, London, pages 411-412. 
79 Article 3(1) TFEU. 
80 Article 207(1) TFEU. See also Article 133(5) of the EC Treaty, as amended by the Treaty of 
Nice. 
81 Article 207(2) TFEU. 
82 Under the TFEU the co-decision procedure, as provided for in Article 251 of the EC Treaty, 
is retained unchanged, becoming the "ordinary legislative procedure". 
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important opportunity for the European Parliament to ensure that the common 
commercial policy deals explicitly with the fight against counterfeiting and 
piracy and that aspects relating to intellectual property rights enforcement are 
proportionate, effective and balance the interests of EU stakeholders with the 
avoidance of onerous  enforcement burdens on third countries, particularly 
low-income developing or least-developed countries. 
 
Thirdly, where agreements with one or more third countries or international 
organisations need to be negotiated and concluded (83), if the TFEU comes 
into force this will be done by means of the Council authorising the opening of 
negotiations, adopting negotiating directives, authorising the signing of 
agreements and concluding them (84). The Council may address directives to 
the negotiator and designate a special committee in consultation with which 
the negotiations must be conducted (85). The Council, on a proposal by the 
negotiator, will then adopt a decision authorising the signing of the agreement 
and, if necessary, its provisional application before entry into force (86). In the 
case of association agreements, except where agreements relate exclusively 
to the common foreign and security policy, the Council will then adopt the 
decision concluding the agreement after obtaining the consent of the 
European Parliament (87). In an urgent situation, the European Parliament and 
the Council may agree on a time limit for this consent to be given. 
Nevertheless, even where time limits are agreed, consent must still be given 
by the European Parliament before the Council can adopt the decision 
concluding the agreement. 
 
The requirement that the Council obtain the consent of the European 
Parliament before concluding agreements in effect gives the European 
Parliament a veto over the conclusion of trade agreements. If the European 
Parliament is not satisfied that agreements contain appropriate provisions, for 
instance on measures to combat counterfeiting and piracy, it will have the 
power to prevent these agreements being concluded by the Council.  
 
This veto over agreements is in contrast with the current provisions of the EC 
Treaty, which provides little opportunity for the European Parliament to 
influence provisions of agreements to fight counterfeiting and piracy. Under 
the EC Treaty, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements is by means of 
the Commission submitting proposals to the Council for implementing the 
common commercial policy (88), including the negotiation and conclusion of 
agreements in the fields of trade in the commercial aspects of intellectual 
property (89). The Council is required merely to consult the European 
Parliament before concluding such agreements and the European Parliament 
must then deliver its opinion within a time limit which the Council may lay 
down according to the urgency of the matter and, in the absence of an opinion 
being delivered by the European Parliament within that time limit, the Council 
                                                 
83 Article 218(1) TFEU. 
84 Article 218(2) TFEU. 
85 Article 218(4) TFEU. 
86 Article 218(5) TFEU. 
87 Article 218(6)(a)(i) TFEU. 
88 Article 133(2) of the EC Treaty, as amended by the Treaty of Nice. 
89 Article 133(5) and (7) of the EC Treaty, as amended by the Treaty of Nice. 
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may act (90). Under the EC Treaty, the European Parliament cannot, 
therefore, generally veto agreements and must deliver an opinion by a time 
limit imposed by the Council (91). 
 
Fourthly, if the TFEU comes into force a decision by the Council concluding 
agreements between the European Union and international organisations, 
including future amendments to the TRIPS Agreement, would also require the 
consent of the European Parliament (92). The assent of the European 
Parliament (i.e. the approval vote by the European Parliament on the basis of 
a simple majority) will be required because the TFEU provides that the 
Council will adopt the decision concluding the agreement after obtaining the 
consent of the European Parliament in the case of agreements covering fields 
to which the ordinary legislative procedure applies, or the special legislative 
procedure where the consent of the European Parliament is required (93). As 
with the conclusion of association agreements, the European Parliament and 
the Council may, in an urgent situation, agree upon a time-limit for consent. 
Given that agreements between the European Union and international 
organisations are not subject to the European Parliament’s assent in the 
current EC Treaty (94), this would be an important and significant increase in 
the European Parliament’s role in the conclusion of agreements with 
international organisations. 
 
Fifthly, if the TFEU comes into force, there will also be possibilities for the 
European Parliament to have a veto over subsequent modifications to 
agreements that have already been concluded. However, whether or not the 
European Parliament will have a veto over subsequent modifications to 
agreements will depend on whether consent is specifically required by the 
provisions of agreements as initially concluded. 
 
The inclusion of a provision in agreements that requires the consent of the 
European Parliament before subsequent modifications are made will be 
necessary because, by way of derogation from the procedure set out in the 
TFEU for adoption of the decision concluding an agreement, the Council may 
authorise the negotiator to approve on the Union’s behalf any subsequent 
modifications to the agreement where an agreement explicitly provides for 
such modifications to be adopted by a simplified procedure or by a body set 
up by the agreement. The Council may also attach specific conditions to such 
authorisation (95). 
 
If the TFEU comes into force, the European Parliament should scrutinise 
agreements to ensure that they do not contain provisions allowing for 
modifications to the agreement to be adopted by a simplified procedure or by 
                                                 
90 Article 300(3) of the EC Treaty, as amended by the Treaty of Nice. 
91 However, there are some exceptions under the EC treaty for agreements that fulfill certain 
criteria, for example establishing an institutional framework, association agreements, or 
agreements with budgetary consequences for the Community. This is why the assent 
procedure for has been used for the TRIPS Agreement in the past. 
92 Article 216(1) TFEU. For a discussion see Leal-Arcas, R. (2008) “The EU Constitutional 
Treaty and International Trade”, in The Rise And Fall of the EU's Constitutional Treaty, 
Laursen, F., Brill/Nijhoff, Leiden, pages 34-35. 
93 Article 218(6)(a) (v) TFEU. 
94 Article 300(3) EC Treaty, as amended by the Treaty of Nice. 
95 Article 218(7) TFEU. 
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a body set up by the agreement where this would remove the requirement for 
the Council to obtain consent from the European Parliament before 
concluding such modifications. 
 
Sixthly, if the TFEU comes into force, the procedure for concluding 
agreements will apply subject to the Commission making recommendations to 
the Council, which will authorise the Commission to open the necessary 
negotiations. The Council and the Commission will then be responsible for 
ensuring that the agreements negotiated are comparable with internal Union 
policies and rules (96). The Commission will conduct these negotiations in 
consultation with a special committee appointed by the Council to assist the 
Commission in this task and within the framework of such directives as the 
Council may issue to it. The Commission will report regularly to the special 
committee and to the European Parliament on the progress of negotiations 
(97). It is therefore recommended that the European Parliament put in place 
procedures to ensure effective scrutiny of these reports on the progress of 
negotiations submitted to it by the Commission. 
 
The current procedure for concluding agreements under the EC Treaty is 
generally the same as the procedure described above (98).  However the 
procedure under the EC Treaty differs from the TFEU in one important respect 
– at present the Commission is required to report regularly to the special 
committee on the progress of negotiations, but not to the European 
Parliament as would be the case under the new arrangements established by 
the TFEU (99). 
 
The current EC Treaty also includes derogations where the negotiation and 
conclusion of agreements in the fields of trade in services and the commercial 
aspects of intellectual property related to trade in cultural and audiovisual 
services, educational services, and social and human health services. In such 
instances, the negotiation and conclusion of agreements fall within the shared 
competence of the Community and its Member States (100). Consequently, in 
addition to a Community decision taken in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of the EC Treaty, the negotiation of such agreements requires the 
common accord of the Member States and agreements negotiated in this way 
were required to be concluded jointly by the Community and the Member 
States. If the TFEU comes into force, this derogation for trade in cultural and 
audiovisual services will be removed although these areas will still require 
unanimity in the Council (101). 
 
Moreover, if the TFEU comes into force, the European Union’s Member State 
parliaments will no longer ratify international trade agreements, such as 
amendments to the TRIPS Agreement, since the European Union will have 
exclusive competence in relation to common commercial policy, including the 
conclusion of tariff and trade agreements relating to the commercial aspects 
of intellectual property. This will reduce the influence that European Union 
                                                 
96 Article 207(3)(2) TFEU. 
97 Article 207(3)(3) TFEU. 
98 Article 133(3) of the EC Treaty, as amended by the Treaty of Nice. 
99 Article 133(3)(2) of the EC Treaty, as amended by the Treaty of Nice. 
100 Article 133(6)(2) of the EC Treaty, as amended by the Treaty of Nice. 
101 Article 207(4)(a) TFEU. 
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Member States have over such agreements. At present national parliaments 
have relatively limited power to influence trade policy and, under the TFEU, 
the influence of Member States and their parliaments would decrease further. 
 
Key considerations and policy recommendations 
 
In scrutinising and giving consent to agreements, it is recommended that the  
European Parliament takes account of the following: 
 
1. Reliable information and statistics as the basis for evidence-based 
arguments 
 
If intellectual property enforcement provisions in agreements are to be 
introduced, this must be done on the basis of adequate evidence on the level 
of counterfeiting and piracy and its effects. At present there is insufficient 
reliable evidence to confirm whether or not additional enforcement provisions 
are necessary in trade agreements in order to address problems of 
counterfeiting and piracy.  
 
The European Parliament should encourage the exchange of information and 
statistics between the EU and third countries in order to allow the EU to build 
an accurate picture of levels of counterfeiting and piracy as a precursor to 
provisions on enforcement of intellectual property rights in bilateral trade 
agreements. 
 
The lack of reliable information and statistics is exacerbated by the absence of 
harmonised definitions of “counterfeiting” and “piracy” that would allow 
accurate estimates to be made of the impact on international trade. When 
considering the inclusion of provisions on enforcement of intellectual property 
rights in agreements, the European Parliament should use definitions of 
counterfeiting and piracy set out in Article 51, footnote 14 of the TRIPS 
Agreement and, in particular, should ensure that such provisions not include 
patent infringement, the enforcement of which is more appropriately dealt with 
by private rights holders by bringing infringement proceedings before national 
courts, nor hinder legitimate parallel trade. 
 
In addition, a clear distinction must be made between private non-commercial 
use and commercial use of infringing products. Definitions of counterfeiting 
and piracy should deal only with commercial use of infringing products. 
 
2. Intellectual property rights as private rights 
 
It has been suggested that consideration should be given to agreements 
containing provisions to strengthen civil and criminal remedies to more 
effectively redress the harm caused to intellectual property rights holders.  
 
However, intellectual property rights are private rights and the main 
responsibility for taking measures to protect and enforce intellectual property 
rights should lie with individual right holders. While provisions on enforcement 
of intellectual property rights in agreements should require third countries to 
provide appropriate legal mechanisms to enable intellectual property rights 
holders to enforce their rights and bear the costs of doing so, this should be 
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primarily a matter of private law in the country in which the intellectual 
property rights are protected rather than a criminal law matter in those 
jurisdictions. 
 
3. Utilising TRIPS flexibilities 
 
The European Parliament should consider carefully the need to balance 
flexibilities contained in the TRIPS Agreement concerning the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights with the need for TRIPS-plus provisions to fight 
counterfeiting and piracy. In particular, agreements with third countries should 
be in accordance with the objectives set out in Article 7 of the TRIPS 
Agreement (102). Agreements with third countries should therefore balance the 
legitimate interests of rights holders with public interest concerns in 
developing countries. 
 
The European Parliament should ensure that the principles established under 
the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health and in 
particular the use of TRIPS flexibilities by developing countries are not 
undermined by TRIPS-plus provisions in bilateral trade agreements. 
 
4. Border measures concerning exports or goods in transit 
 
It has been suggested that consideration should be given to bilateral trade 
agreements containing provisions to expanding the scope of border measures 
to cover exports as well as goods in transit or transhipment. The TRIPS 
Agreement does not oblige WTO Members to make available border 
measures concerning exports or goods in transit. In order to enable customs 
to fight counterfeiting and piracy effectively, it is argued that customs need the 
authority to suspend goods destined for export and goods in transit, as well as 
imported goods. 
 
Furthermore, the TRIPS Agreement obliges WTO Members to enable right 
holders to make applications for border seizures to competent authorities but 
does not specify what those competent authorities must be, for instance in 
some countries applications for border seizures are dealt with by courts rather 
than directly with customs. 
 
However it is recommended that any requirement on customs to deal with this 
task also ensures that applications are processed in a fair and effective 
manner without unnecessarily burdening the courts and that enforcement 
actions should be submitted directly to the customs that will process 
applications and decide whether to take the requested actions or refuse the 
application, subject to the availability of judicial review by administrative or 
civil courts. 
 
5. Avoid undermining the multilateral trading system 
 
The WTO dispute settlement procedure should be the primary mechanism for 
ensuring adequate enforcement of intellectual property rights in third 
countries. 
                                                 
102 Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement, op. cit. 
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The dispute settlement chapters in US bilateral trade agreements tend to go 
further than those of the EU by establishing the application of non-violation 
and situation complaints that are suspended under the TRIPS Agreement.  
 
The Hong Kong Ministerial Meeting of the WTO extended the moratorium on 
non-violation complaints relating to intellectual property rights provisions of the 
TRIPS agreement being brought and this moratorium should be respected in 
bilateral trade agreements. 
 
Bilateral agreements that contain provisions on recourse to dispute settlement 
mechanisms established in the agreements, which can be triggered in cases 
of the non-compliance with the required “highest” standards of intellectual 
property rights protection may also be problematic. They risk weakening the 
multilateral dispute settlement system and diminishing the legitimate interests 
of third countries to utilise TRIPS flexibilities to regulate the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights according to the development priorities of each 
country that are permitted under the TRIPS Agreement. 
 
6. Build capacity in third countries 
 
Building capacity in third countries is the most effective way to enhance 
enforcement of intellectual property rights. Police, customs officers, judiciary 
and other government officials in third countries, particularly developing 
countries, are often in need of specialised training and assistance in 
identifying and enforcing counterfeit and pirated goods. 
 
The European Parliament should encourage the EU to undertake needs 
assessments in third countries to ensure that adequate and appropriate IP-
related technical and financial cooperation is made available on mutually 
agreed terms and conditions in order to assist with the training of police, 
customs officers, judiciary and other government officials to enable them to 
combat counterfeiting and piracy effectively and also to assist in the utilisation 
of TRIPS flexibilities in accordance with the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health. 
 
In order to generate greater awareness amongst consumers and 
intermediaries that economic damage can result for counterfeit and pirated 
goods, the European Parliament should also support initiatives to raise 
awareness of counterfeiting and piracy issues amongst consumers in third 
countries. 
 
7. Inter-parliamentary observatory 
 
Given the importance of effective parliamentary scrutiny of provisions 
concerning enforcement for intellectual property rights in agreements with 
third countries, and in the light of the changing role of national parliaments 
and the European Parliament in relation to agreements if the TFEU comes 
into force, it would be advantageous to establish a parliamentary forum or an 
inter-parliamentary observatory to monitor and assess the impact of such 
agreements in the fight against counterfeiting and piracy.  
 
